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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The major issues presented on appeal are as follows: Was the 
issue of wrongful discharge improperly submitted to the jury and was 
the jury's finding on this issue unsupported by the evidence? Was 
there insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict regarding 
malicious prosecution and were the instructions given to the jury 
on that issue erroneous? Was the issue of punitive damages erroneously 
submitted to the jury? Was the jury instruction regarding special 
and general damages erroneous? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Shauna Hodges filed an action against her former employer, 
Gibson's Products Co.f Inc., hereinafter, Gibson's, and Gibson's 
former West Valley Store manager, Chad Crosgrove, hereinafter, 
Crosgrove. Ms. Hodges alleged that defendants had maliciously 
prosecuted her for theft of daily receipts, wrongfully discharged 
her from her employment as a bookkeeper, and intentionally inflicted 
emotional distress. Slander and libel claims were alleged and then 
subsequently dismissed by Ms. Hodges. 
Course of the Proceedings 
This matter was tried to a jury before the Honorable John A. 
Rokich on July 9-13, 1985. 
Disposition 
The jury entered a Special Verdict, finding Gibson's and 
Crosgrove liable for malicious prosecution and Gibson's liable for 
wrongful termination. The jury found Gibson's and Crosgrove not 
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liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The jury 
awarded Mrs. Hodges $70,000 in compensatory damages and $7,000 in 
punitive damages from Gibson's and $10,000 in compensatory damages 
and $1,000 in punitive damages from Crosgrove. 
Statement of the Facts 
Shauna Hodges began working as a bookkeeper at Gibson's West 
Valley Store in October, 1980. (Tr. 315) As bookkeeper, it was her 
responsibility to balance the cash registers in use at the store on 
a particular day. (Tr. 316, 371) She did this by counting all of 
the checks, cash, charge slips and other forms of payment received 
at each cash register in use on a particular day and reconciled the 
totals received with the Z-tapes and detail tapes removed at the 
time the store closed from those registers which had been in use 
that day. (Tr. 194, 195, 197, 198, 318-320) The total receipts from 
each register were recorded by Ms. Hodges on a form called the Daily 
Report and then she prepared a bank deposit. (Ex. 8D and Tr. 318-320) 
Chad Crosgrove was the manager of Gibson's West Valley Store 
on September 3, 19 81. (Tr. 191-19 2) On that day, he closed the store 
at approximately 9:00 p.m. (Tr. 192-193) 
In closing out the cash registers in use that evening, Crosgrove 
closed out or Z'd out the cash register by putting a key in the Z 
position on the register. (Tr. 19 4, 195, 19 8) This produced the Z 
tape containing the totals for the day. (Tr. 19 7) The cashiers then 
removed everything from the register cash drawer, leaving only $100 
in the drawer. (Tr. 19 3-195) The rest of the contents of each cash 
register drawer were placed in a money bag marked with the number of 
the cash register. (Tr. 195, 196, 198, 199) The register drawer 
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containing $100, the money bag and the Z tape were then brought by 
the cashier to the service desk. (Tr. 196, 197, 199) 
All of the money bags from the cash registers used that day 
were put in a bag along with the Z-tapes. The bag was then placed in 
the safe along with the cash register drawers. (Tr. 203, 204, 210, 
211f 212) 
On the following morning, September 4, 1981, Crosgrove opened 
the store. (Tr. 217) He opened the safe, removed some of the cash 
drawers and placed them in the cash registers which he felt he would 
need for that day. (Tr. 217f 241) A paper sack containing the cash 
register money bags and the Z-tapes from September 3, 1981 was left 
in the safe. (Tr. 241) 
When Shauna Hodges came to work on the morning of September 4, 
1981, she contacted Crosgrove to obtain the bag containing the 
individual cash register money bags and cash register tapes from the 
previous day. (Tr. 323) The bag containing the money bags and cash 
register tapes was taken upstairs to Ms. Hodges1 office, a room with 
a locked door, known as the "security room". (Tr. 317, 321-324) 
In her office, Shauna Hodges then proceeded with her daily 
procedure of reconciling the receipts of each cash register with the 
cash register tapes in preparation of the Daily Report and deposit. 
(Tr. 318, 319, 371, 372) Entries on the Daily Report were arrived at 
by first totalling the receipts at each register and then adding the 
amounts received in all of the registers to arrive at the total for 
the day. (Tr. 375, 376) Shauna Hodges completed her procedure and 
turned the Daily Report and bank deposit in to Crosgrove at about 
1:00 p.m.. (Tr. 324) She left work shortly thereafter. (Tr. 324) 
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Later on that day, the assistant manager, Glen Murray, reviewed 
the Daily Report and noticed that cash register #4 was not listed on 
it. (Tr. 251, 252) He asked Crosgrove whether that register had been 
in use on September 3, 1981, and Crosgrove confirmed that it had. 
(Tr. 252) Crosgrove telephoned Shauna Hodges and asked her about 
register #4. (Tr. 253) Shauna Hodges indicated that she would return 
to the store. (Tr. 253) 
Crosgrove and Glen Murray went upstairs to the security room 
to look for the receipts from register #4. (Tr. 252, 253, 255) They 
found part of a cash register Z-tape from register #4 in the security 
room garbage. (Tr. 258-260) Crosgrove then telephoned the Murray 
store and was requested to bring the deposit, the Daily Report and 
other information prepared with the Daily Report to the Murray store 
for review by Ron Harris, accountant/auditor for Gibson's. (Tr. 261, 
265, 458) 
Ron Harris met with Crosgrove at the Gibson's Murray Store in 
an effort to determine what had happened. (Tr. 459) Ron Harris and 
Crosgrove then went to the West Valley Store, where they, along with 
Glen Murray, continued the investigation in the security room. (Tr. 
266, 461) As part of their investigation, Harris, Crosgrove and 
Murray went through the security room wastepaper can, which had been 
secured by Glen Murray earlier. (Tr. 266, 463) 
Examination of the garbage can contents revealed items whic 
indicated that register #4 had been in use on September 3, 19 81, ar 
that the register #4 money bag had made it up to the security offic 
on September 4, 1981. (Exs. 10D, 11D, 12D, Tr. 278-283, 463, 46' 
The garbage contained voids from register #4, various adding machir 
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tapes which correlated to the totals entered on the Daily Report, the 
Z-tape from register #4 and deposit slips from a checking account 
for James B. or Shauna F. Hodges. (Exs. 10D, 11D, 12D, 17D, 20D, 21D, 
Tr. 259, 266, 287, 288, 463, 492, 494, 501) A void slip representing 
sales incorrectly rung on register #4 on September 3, 19 81, was found 
between Shauna Hodges1 checking account deposit slips. (Tr. 267, 
279, 287, 288) 
The investigation by Harris indicated that checks received at 
register #4 were included with the deposit for funds received with 
register #2. (Tr. 459, 465) This was discerned by comparing the 
checks received with the detail tapes from the cash registers. (Tr. 
29 3, 465) The back of each check had a transaction number which 
corresponded with the transaction number on the detail tape of a 
particular cash register. (Tr. 465) Checks included with the deposit 
prepared by Shauna Hodges on September 4, 1981, indicated that they 
were received at register #4 on September 3, 19 81. (Tr. 291, 292, 
29 3) The Daily Report, however, reflected no transactions on register 
#4 on that day. (Ex. 8D, Tr. 466) 
Harris1 investigation revealed that an amount equivalent to the 
total sales rung on register #4, $580.66, was not included with the 
deposit, nor was register #4 included on the Daily Report. (Ex. 8D, 
Tr. 466, 478, 479) However, checks received at register #4 were 
included with the deposit and evidence indicating use of register #4 
on September 3, 1981, was found in the security room wastebasket. 
(Tr. 259, 260, 266, 287, 463, 478, 479, 492, 494) 
Shauna Hodges, on her return to the store on September 4, 1981, 
after the telephone call from Crosgrove, was asked why she had torn 
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up and thrown away the Z-tapes from register #4. (Tr. 259) She 
replied that she thought it had all zeroes on it. (Tr. 259) 
On September 8f 19 81f a meeting was held at the Murray store. 
(Tr. 330) Shauna Hodges, her husband, Chad Crosgrovef Ron Harris, 
Dale Birch, Gibson's controller at that time, and Bob Cornettf the 
general manager at that time, were present. (Tr. 51, 269, 330) At 
the meeting, Shauna Hodges denied taking the money. (Tr. 331) 
On September 9, 1981, Chad Crosgrove, Ron Harris and Bob Cornett 
went to the offices of Detective Lyday of the West Valley City Police 
Department and reported the missing money. (Tr. 11, 25, 26, 27, 271) 
Detective Lyday made an initial report of the information received. 
(Ex. 3-P, Tr. 37) Detective Lyday contacted Shauna Hodges by telephone 
but she declined to talk to him without an attorney. (Tr. 45) 
Detective Lyday filed his report with the County Attorney's Office. 
(Tr. 37) 
Based upon Detective Lyday's report, Lee Dever, Deputy County 
Attorney, commenced prosecution of Shauna Hodges. (Tr. 99, 100) 
Detective Lyday's investigation indicated that there was probable 
cause to believe that Shauna Hodges had committed theft and Mr. Dever 
issued an Information. (Ex. 5-P, Tr. 108, 112) A preliminary hearing 
was held at which time the cash register tapes and items from register 
#4 were presented. (Tr. 112) Shauna Hodges was bound over at the 
preliminary hearing. (Tr. 48) 
Before the trial of Shauna Hodges, Mr. Dever learned from someone 
at Gibson's that Crosgrove had been discharged from Gibson's for 
embezzlement. (Tr. 103, 106) Mr. Dever determined that Crosgrove 
would not be a credible witness against Shauna Hodges and moved to 
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dismiss the charges against her, (Tr. 103, 111, 112) His motion to 
dismiss was not a statement that Shauna Hodges was not guilty of 
theft but just that Lee Dever had elected not to proceed with the 
case against her. (Tr. 112) The criminal action against Shauna 
Hodges was dismissed by the court. (Tr. 107) 
Summary of Argument 
Shauna Hodges, plaintiff-respondent, did not allege that she 
was employed by Gibson's for a specific term. She did not consider 
herself to be anything but an at-will employee. Because Utah law 
does not recognize any exceptions to the rule that an at-will employee 
may be discharged at any time with or without good cause, Ms. Hodges 
was not entitled to submit the issue of wrongful discharge to the 
jury. The Court's submission of this issue for the jury's 
consideration was not only erroneous, but prejudicial to the case 
of defendants-appellants. 
The plaintiff-respondent's cause of action for malicious 
prosecution also should have been disposed of by the Court before 
submission to the jury because the plaintiff-respondent failed to 
prove essential elements of her cause of action. The defendants-
appellants had probable cause to go to the prosecuting authorities 
with the information available to them in September, 1981. 
Gibson' s and Crosgrove were entitled to then rely on the decisions 
of the police and prosecuting attorney as to the sufficiency of the 
evidence they had produced. 
Plaintiff-respondent produced no evidence that any employee or 
agent of Gibson's interfered with the prosecutors' discretion in 
regard to the prosecution of Ms. Hodges. The plaintiff-respondent 
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produced no evidence that information was withheld by defendants-
appellants from the prosecuting authorities with regard to the loss 
from register #4 on September 3, 19 81. 
All of the evidence pointed to the existence of probable cause 
to prosecute Ms. Hodges at the time the Gibson's employees went to 
the police. This evidence also negates the existence of malice in 
the actions of defendants-appellants. 
Plaintiff-respondent further failed to prove that the criminal 
action was terminated in her favor. The exigencies of the prosecutor's 
busy schedule and the inexperience of defendants-appellants in matters 
of this sort are as plausible explanations for the dismissal as the 
innocence of plaintiff-respondent. 
Several of the Court's instructions with regard to malicious 
prosecution either misstate the law (Instruction #34), misinterpret 
the facts (Instruction #30)
 f or prejudice the defendants-appellants 
by their wording (Instruction #26). The combined effect of these 
erroneous instructions was prejudicial to the defendants-appellants 
and, in effect, direct the jury's verdict for the plaintiff-
respondent. 
The trial court's submission of punitive damages was also 
erroneous. On the state of the facts adduced at trial, the 
extraordinary remedy of punitive damages was unjustified because the 
defendants-appellants did not exhibit willful and malicious conduct 
or reckless indifference to plaintiff-respondent. On the contrary, 
they were exhibiting a business judgment based on the facts available 
to them at the time they went to the police. 
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There was no submission to the jury of issues concerning Gibson's 
imputed liability. However, even if plaintiff-respondent had been 
able to prove that Chad Crosgrove had instigated a prosecution of 
plaintiff-respondent to hide his own misdeeds, no liability for his 
actions could be imputed to Gibson's. There was no proof that Mr. 
Crosgrove
 f acting to cover his own misdeeds, was acting in furtherance 
of his employer's interests or that Gibson's was negligent in either 
employing or retaining him. These are the only two bases upon which 
Gibson's could be held liable to plaintiff-respondent for the willful 
act of malicious prosecution by its agents. 
The court improperly submitted the issue of damages to the jury. 
The court's instruction states amounts which exceed the prayer of 
the plaintiff-respondent's complaint. The defendants-appellants 
were prejudiced by an increased verdict award as a result of this 
misstatement. Additionally, plaintiff-respondent failed to present 
specific, well-founded evidence with regard to her special damages. 
The jury was left to speculate with regard to her actual damages to 
the detriment of defendants-appellants. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE ISSUE OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE WAS 
IMPROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY 
A. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IS NOT A CAUSE 
OF ACTION IN UTAH 
This Court has consistently applied the "terminable-at-will" 
doctrine to the discharge of employees who are not employed for a 
definite term. The court stated the general principle in Bihlmaier 
v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979), as follows: 
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.•.in the absence of some further express 
or implied stipulation as to the duration of the 
employment or of a good consideration in addition 
to the services contracted to be rendered, the 
contract is no more than an indefinite general 
hiring which is terminable at the will of either 
party. 603 P.2d 790, 792. 
See also: Williams v. West Jordan City, 714 F.2d 1017 (10th Cir.f 
1983); Held v. American Linen Supply, 6 Utah 2d 106, 307 P. 2d 210 
(1957); Crane Co. v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870 (Utah 1978). 
In Amos v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints, 594 F. Supp. 791 (D. Utah 1984), the federal 
court rejected plaintiffs1 argument that the court should imply an 
exception to the "at-will" doctrine set forth in Bihlmaier, supra. 
The court stated: 
Here, the Utah Supreme Court has never recognized 
an exception to the terminable-at-will doctrine 
in any of its cases and has not indicated that 
it would recognize an exception under certain 
circumstances. 594 F. Supp. 791, 829, fn 73. 
The jury in this case, however, was instructed otherwise. They 
were instructed, in fact, that there is an exception to the terminable-
at-will rule. Instruction No. 43 (R. 442) given to the jury reads 
as follows: 
Plaintiff was free to quit her employment with 
defendant at any time, and defendant was free 
to discharge plaintiff at any time without cause. 
However, if you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that the plaintiff was discharged on 
the basis of a false criminal accusation known 
to defendant Gibson Products Company to be false, 
then you may find the defendant Gibson Products 
Company guilty of wrongful discharge of the 
plaintiff. 
This instruction is contrary to Utah law. 
A number of courts have rejected an employee's attempt to 
introduce exceptions to the at-will doctrine. In Daniel v. Magma 
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Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 320, 620 P.2d 699 (Ariz. App. 1980) , the Arizona 
court held that adhering to the rule proposed by plaintiff (i.e., 
that bad faith discharge was contrary to public policy and harmful 
to the economic system) would subject an employer to a lawsuit each 
time an at-will employee is discharged. In addition, the court 
would, in effect, be rewriting the employment contract. 
The Illinois court declined to introduce an exception to the 
rule because the court would be forced to replace the employer's 
business judgment with its own. Criscione v. Sears, Roebuck & Co>, 
66 111. App. 3d 664, 23 111. Dec. 455, 384 NE 2d 91 (1978). 
In Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hospital, 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 
1977) and Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562, 409 A.2d 581 (1979), both 
courts expressed concern that instituting exceptions as proposed by 
the plaintiffs would create too nebulous a standard for the courts 
to apply. 
The policy adhered to by these courts and the Utah court, weighs 
in favor of allowing employers to make business decisions with regard 
to their policies and procedures, and who should be employed to 
conduct the business. 
Mrs. Hodges has never contended that she had any contract with 
Gibson's which specified the term of her employment. There were no 
specific procedures or policies which Gibson's would be required to 
follow in terminating an at-will employee. Gibson's did not need 
to show a specific reason or motive for termination. The presentation 
of this issue to the jury was erroneous. 
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B. THE JURY'S FINDING ON THIS ISSUE 
IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
Even if the issue of wrongful discharge was properly submitted 
to the jury, and the instruction to the jury thereon was a correct 
statement of Utah law, the jury's finding on this issue is wholly 
unsupported by the evidence. There is no evidence that Shauna Hodges 
was discharged by a false criminal accusation known by defendant-
appellant Gibson Products Company to be false. 
Dale Birch, Gibson's controller at the time the events in 
question in this case occurred, stated in his testimony that Shauna 
Hodges had responsibility and control of the cash and funds and 
register receipts from the time they were given to her. Since she 
denied that anyone else was involved in changing the records, he 
assumed that she made the changes. (Tr. 56-57) 
The evidence supports a finding that Gibson's believed the 
accusation against Ms. Hodges to be true. 
POINT II: THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT REGARDING 
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION 
A. PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROVE THAT 
DEFENDANTS DID NOT HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE AND 
ACTED WITH MALICE, AND THAT THE CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDING WAS TERMINATED IN HER FAVOR 
The basic elements of a cause of action for malicious prosecution 
are contained in Restatement (Second) Torts, § 653, which states: 
A private person who initiates or procures the 
institution of criminal proceedings against 
another who is not guilty of the offense charged 
is subject to liability for malicious prosecution 
if 
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(a) he initiates or procures the proceedings 
without probable cause and primarily for a 
purpose other than that of bringing an offender 
to justice, and 
(b) the proceedings have terminated in favor 
of the accused. 
Each of these elements must be proved by Ms. Hodges to prevail. Her 
proof in this action failed in that she failed to prove that either 
Gibson's or Crosgrove did not have probable cause to bring charges, 
that defendants-appellants acted primarily for a purpose other than 
that of bringing an offender to justice or with malice, and that the 
action was terminated in favor of Shauna Hodges. 
Probable cause, as used in this context, refers to known facts 
existing at the time of filing the action and that defendants-
appellants1 belief in the substance of the charges was reasonable. 
Patterson v. City of Phoenix, 103 Ariz. 64, 436 P.2d 613 (1968); 
Tulsa Radiology Assoc, Inc. v. Hickman, 683 P.2d 537 (Okla. App. 
1984). The Restatement (Second) Torts, § 662, states the following 
concerning the existence of probable cause: 
One who initiates or continues criminal 
proceedings against another has probable cause 
for doing so if he correctly or reasonably 
believes 
(a) that the person whom he accuses has acted 
or failed to act in a particular manner, and 
(b) that those acts or omissions constitute 
the offense that he charges against the accused, 
and 
(c) that he is sufficiently informed as to 
the law and the facts to justify him in initiating 
or continuing the prosecution. 
At the time employees of Gibson1 s went to the police, they knew 
the following: On September 4, 19 81, Mrs. Hodges received the bag 
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containing the receipts of business for September 3, 19 81. They 
were taken to the locked security office and only Mrs. Hodges was 
present during the accounting process. When she completed the 
accounts, Mrs. Hodges locked the security office door and took the 
accounts to the manager, who put them in the safe pending deposit. 
A discrepancy was noted in the Daily Report, in that there were no 
totals for register #4, which had been used the previous day. Closer 
investigation of the receipts in comparison to the cash register 
tapes revealed that cash had been deducted from register #2 and 
checks of equal value from register #4 substituted. The garbage can 
from the security office contained the register Z-tape from register 
#4 which was torn, along with a void from register #4 torn inside a 
deposit slip from Ms. Hodges1 checking account and calculator tapes 
which totalled the checks from each drawer. When Ms. Hodges was 
questioned about these items, she stated that she had thrown away 
the tape from register #4 because she thought it was all zeroes and 
offered no other possible explanation for the discrepancy. 
When the employees of Gibson's went to the police with this 
information, they were not aware of what evidence would be required 
to bring a charge against Ms. Hodges. From the evidence presented, 
the police took the information to the county attorney who stated in 
his testimony that probable cause existed at the time of filing. 
(Tr. 112) 
The burden of proof is upon plaintiff-respondent to show that 
this evidence was not sufficient to support a charge of theft at the 
time the charge is brought. Tulsa Radiology Assoc, Inc. v. Hickman, 
supra.; Bird v. Rothman, 128 Ariz. 599, 627 P.2d 1097 (Ariz. App. 
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1981); Restatement (Second) Tortsf § 672. With the information set 
forth above, there was reasonable and probable cause for defendants-
appellants to go to the authorities. 
Reliance upon the advice of counsel in pressing charges, 
including the advice of a public prosecutor, negates lack of probable 
cause, where the advice is sought in good faith and with full 
disclosure of the facts within the accuser's knowledge. Perkins v. 
Stephens, 28 Utah 2d 436, 503 P.2d 1212 (1972); Wendleboe v. Jacobson, 
10 Utah 2d 344, 353 P.2d 178 (1960); Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Co., 
5 Utah 2d 187, 299 P.2d 622 (1956); Restatement (Second) Torts, §§ 
653, comment g; 666. The plaintiff-respondent contended in this 
action that full and fair disclosure was not made to the prosecutor 
in this case. It is evident, however, that the report prepared by 
Officer Lyday (Ex. 3), and the subsequent information filed by the 
county attorney (Ex. 4), contain the information provided by the 
testimony of the employees of Gibson's who testified at trial of 
this matter. 
There is no evidence from the testimony of either Officer Lyday 
or County Attorney Dever that any employee of Gibson's interfered 
with the decision to prosecute Mrs. Hodges. Indeed, the evidence is 
to the contrary. At the time the prosecution commenced, defendants-
appellants had a reasonable belief that the information presented 
to the prosecuting authorities was sufficient to support the charges. 
That belief negates at least the lack-of-probable-cause element and 
most likely, the existence of malice. Restatement (Second) Torts, 
§ 669 
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Plaintiff has additionally relied on the fact that the charges 
were eventually dismissed to show that probable cause did not exist 
at the time of filing charges. The very nature of the process of 
criminal litigation would make such an assertion not only illogical, 
but unfair. As the court stated in Patterson v. City of Phoenix, 
103 Ariz. 64, 436 P.2d 613 (1968), "There could be any number of 
reasons for dismissal having no bearing whatsoever on the existence 
of probable cause at the time the charges were filed." 436 P.2d 613, 
619. The Restatement (Second) Torts, § 665(2), states that "The 
abandonment of criminal proceedings by a public prosecutor acting 
on his own initiative after the prosecution has passed into his 
control, is not evidence that the private prosecutor acted without 
probable cause." 
Looking at the present case, the exigencies of a busy prosecution 
calendar had an impact on a decision to dismiss the prosecution of 
plaintiff-respondent. On the day before the trial was scheduled, 
he learned from someone at Gibson's that Mr. Crosgrove, his chief 
witness, had terminated his employment as a result of his embezzlement 
from Gibson's. Obviously, this would undercut Mr. Crosgrove's 
testimony and Mr. Dever's ability to revise his trial preparation 
and strategy. The fact that the situation had changed from the time 
of filing the information and the trial does not negate the existence 
of probable cause at the time of filing the charges. Mr. Dever, 
himself, stated that he believed that there was probable cause at 
the time charges were filed to believe that Shauna Hodges committed 
theft. (Tr. 108, 112) He further stated that his decision to move 
to dismiss the charges against Ms. Hodges was not a statement that 
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she was not guilty of theft but rather one that he elected not to 
proceed with the case against her. (Tr. 112) 
B. THE COURT GAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE 
JURY WHICH WERE ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THEY 
ARE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT 
TRIAL AND TO UTAH LAW 
For the same reasons as presented above, it is questionable 
whether the criminal proceedings were terminated in favor of plaint-^. 
and not merely dismissed because of the difficulty mounting the 
revised prosecution on short notice. Generally, abandonment of 
proceedings because a conviction has become impossible is a sufficient 
termination in favor of the accused. Restatement (Second) Torts, § 
660, comment d. Instruction #30 (R. 429) given to the jury, however, 
directs a finding on this issue in favor of Ms. Hodges. Instruction 
#30 reads as follows: 
I hereby instruct you that the criminal 
action against the plaintiff was dismissed by 
the court and that it was therefore terminated 
favorably on behalf of the plaintiff. 
In this case, there is no proof that the dismissal of plaintiff was 
based upon her innocence. 
Plaintiff-respondent has also alleged that full and fair 
disclosure could not have been made because, in the words of the 
Court's instruction #34 (R. 433), Gibson's should have been "entirely 
familiar with facts..." and sufficiently informed "to initiate 
criminal proceedings without further investigation." This direction 
from the trial court is unsupported by case law and is totally 
unreasonable, especially in light of the evidence that defendants-
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appellants relied on the advice of the prosecutor in evaluating the 
sufficiency of evidence. 
The court imposes a duty upon a complainant "to make some 
reasonable search and inquiry before filing the criminal complaint," 
but no duty to exclude all other possibilities. Potter v. Utah Driv-
Ur-Self System, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 133, 355 P.2d 714 (1960), at 717. 
It would seem reasonable that defendants-appellants could rely upon 
the prosecuting authorities to either direct Gibson's employees to 
gather more information, if necessary, or to conduct any other 
necessary investigation independently. It is evident from their 
testimony that neither Officer Lyday nor Mr. Dever felt the necessity 
of making further investigation. 
The courtfs instructions were additionally erroneous in that 
they frequently refer to "guilt" of defendants-appellants. The 
initial instruction entitled, "Elements of Malicious Prosecution," 
implies that defendants-appellants are criminally responsible for a 
finding of malicious prosecution by using-the word "guilty" several 
times within the instruction. Instruction #26 (R. 425). Such a 
connotation works to prejudice defendants-appellants and, since it 
is the basic instruction with regard to that cause of action, it 
unfairly sets the minds of the jury in the criminal guilt-innocence 
context. 
The combined effect of these erroneous instructions was, in 
effect, to direct the jury's finding in favor of the plaintiff-
respondent on the issue of malicious prosecution. 
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POINT III: THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES WAS ERRONEOUSLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY 
This Court has consistently held that punitive damages should 
be awarded only in the most extraordinary of circumstances. The 
award must serve the dual purpose of punishment and as an example 
to others disposed to the same behavior. Thus, the court has reserved 
punitive damages for cases in which the defendant's conduct has 
approached intentional. Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd.
 y 
701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985); Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 
1985); Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983). 
The law requires that plaintiff establish that defendant's 
conduct was willful and malicious or manifested a knowing and reckless 
indifference toward, and disregard of, the rights of others. Behrens, 
supra. The defendants-appellants in this case have shown that their 
actions were prompted by a reasonable belief that Ms. Hodges committed 
a theft. A reasonable belief of Ms. Hodges1 guilt, negates the 
willful and malicious or reckless state of mind necessary to support 
a claim for punitive damages. 
The present case does not come within the parameters for which 
punitive damages are awarded. Businesses must be allowed to make a 
business decision concerning an employees1 continued employment and 
whether to prosecute an employee suspected of criminal conduct. 
Malicious prosecution actions are not favored in the law because 
they tend to discourage criminal proceedings against those who appear 
guilty. Bearup v. Bearup, 122 Ariz. 509, 596 P.2d 35 (Ariz. App. 
1979); Orser v. State, 582 P.2d 1227 (Mont. 1978); Lampos v. Bazar 
Inc., 527 P.2d 376 (Ore. 1974). Certainly, imposition of punitive 
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damages in such a case as this would have a further chilling effect on 
an employer attempting to bring an employee to justice. 
There is no evidence that any of Gibson's employees acted 
willfully or maliciously in presenting evidence to the prosecutors 
or in terminating plaintiff-respondent's employment. There is 
evidence that Mr. Crosgrove took merchandise from Gibson's without 
paying for it and used money from deposits by delay in making those 
deposits. He was thus able to replace the money with the next day's 
receipts. (Tr. 274, 307, 312-314, 486-487) This was not the method, 
however, used by the person who diverted the proceeds of register #4 
on September 3, 1981. It would certainly not have been of any benefit 
to Mr. Crosgrove, if he was guilty of the theft, to bring it to the 
attention of the authorities. Further, Mr. Crosgrove has denied 
that he was responsible for the theft. (Tr. 302) Thus, if it was 
the intent of plaintiff-respondent to show that Mr. Crosgrove acted 
willfully and maliciously in reporting the loss to the prosecuting 
authorities, that proof failed. 
Even ijE plaintiff-respondent had proved that Mr. Crosgrove took 
the money and sought prosecution of plaintiff-respondent to cover 
his own misdeeds, such activity could not fairly be imputed to Mr. 
Crosgrove's employer, Gibson's, and punitive damages should not have 
been awarded against Gibson's for the actions of Crosgrove. The 
employer may not be held liable for the willful tort of its employee 
unless the tort was committed in furtherance of the employer's 
interests [Barney v. Jewel Tea Co., 104 Utah 292, 239 P.2d 878 (1943) ] 
or if the employer was negligent in employing or retaining the 
employee. Stone v. Hurst Lumber Co., 15 Utah 2d 49, 386 P.2d 910 
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(1963). Restatement (Second) Torts § 909. Comment (b) to Restatement 
(Second) Torts, § 909 explains that the restrictions on awarding 
punitive damages against the master or principal because of the act 
of an agent stem from the reasons for awarding punitive damages, 
"which make it improper ordinarily to award punitive damages against 
one who himself is personally innocent and therefore liable only 
vicariously." 
Neither the issue of whether Crosgrove was acting in furtherance 
of Gibson's interests nor that of whether Gibson's was negligent in 
employing or retaining him was submitted to the jury for resolution. 
Moreover, there was no evidence to support either assertion. 
Gibson's certainly would in no way benefit from the actions of 
Mr. Crosgrove if he had been covering up his own theft. That would be 
an act directly contrary to the interests of Gibson's. 
There was no evidence presented by plaintiff to show that 
Gibson's was negligent in either hiring or retaining Mr. Crosgrove, 
nor was there evidence that Gibson's knew of any improper conduct on 
Mr. Crosgrove's part at the time of going to the police. (Tr. 486-
487) Thus, if it was proved that Mr. Crosgrove was using the 
prosecution of Mrs. Hodges to avoid his own punishment, this could, 
in no way, be attributed to defendant Gibson's. No societal interest 
is served by awarding punitive damages against Gibson's and such an 
award is inappropriate. 
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POINT IV: THE JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING 
SPECIAL AND GENERAL DAMAGES WAS ERRONEOUS 
IN THAT IT DID NOT CONFORM TO THE PLEADINGS 
A. SHAUNA HODGES DID NOT SPECIFICALLY PLEAD 
SPECIAL DAMAGES OR GENERAL DAMAGES IN THE 
AMOUNT OF $200,000 AND SHOULD THEREFORE 
BE PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERY 
The respondent's complaint alleged that as a result of 
defendant's conduct, 
...plaintiff has been injured and suffered 
damages including, but not limited to, loss of 
wages, medical expenses, severe emotional dis-
tress, and mental anguish requiring professional 
therapy, and further pain and suffering at least 
in the amount of $75,000.00, the full extent of 
which has not been determined, and which will 
be established by proof at time of trial." 
(R. 2-11) 
In her prayer for relief, plaintiff prayed for judgment, 
1. In the sum of $75,000.00 and such other 
sum as plaintiff shall establish by proof at 
time of trial; 
2. Exemplary damages at least in the amount 
of $100,000.00; 
3. For costs of suit incurred herein, 
including reasonable attorneys fees; and 
4. For such other and further relief as 
the court deems just. 
In Jury Instruction No. 11 (R. 410), the jury is correctly 
instructed that: 
In this, as in every suit for damages, the parties 
are required to allege the amount of damages 
claimed, and under no circumstances could there 
be an award of damages in excess of the amount 
demanded, but the amount thus alleged constitutes 
no evidence and is no indication of the amount 
to which a party may be entitled.... 
(Similarly, JIFU 90.1). 
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In Jury Instruction No. 46 (R. 445 ) f however, the jury is told 
that: 
The plaintiff alleges that by reason of her 
claimed injuries, for which she claims the 
defendants are liable, she has sustained general 
damages in the sum of $200,000.00 for severe 
emotional distress, mental anguish and pain and 
suffering, and has lost an additional sum of 
$26,515.00 on account of the cost of the therapy 
that she has undergone as a result of the 
malicious prosecution, loss of wages, and costs 
of legal fees for defense of the criminal 
proceedings. 
These allegations are not evidence but are merely 
the extent of the plaintiff's claims, and must 
not be considered by you as evidence in the case. 
Plaintiff's Complaint was never amended to specifically allege 
her special damages nor to include general damages in the amount of 
$200,000.00. Plaintiff's failure to specifically state the extent 
of her special damages prior to the time of trial should preclude 
her recovery. As this Court explained in Graham v. Street, 2 Utah 
2d 144, 270 P.2d 456 (1954), the purpose of such specific pleading is 
to apprise the defendant of the extent of damage and to guide the 
parties and the court in preparation and deliberations. (See also 
Rule 9(g), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) Without such guidance, 
the defendant is placed at a severe disadvantage in meeting the proof 
presented at trial. In this case, defendants-appellants were 
prejudiced by the failure of plaintiff-respondent to specifically 
state her special damages. 
Plaintiff-respondent made no prayer for general damages in the 
amount of $200,000 until the court was to instruct the jury. Plaintiff-
respondent made no motion to amend pursuant to Rule 15(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and defendants-appellants therefore 
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had no opportunity to show that they were prejudiced by such amendment 
at the time of trial. At the time the trial commenced, defendants-
appellants were entitled to rely on the amount pled in plaintiff's 
Complaint as the limit to their liability in this case. Yet the jury 
was instructed that the plaintiff had alleged that she had sustained 
general damages in the amount of $200,000.00. In his final argumentf 
the plaintiff's counsel compounded the prejudice by stating that 
$200
 f 000 was the "price" plaintiff put on her alleged pain and 
suffering. (Supp. Tr. 16) This is clearly erroneous and the jury's 
verdict based on the erroneous instruction and the argument of 
plaintiff's counsel is contrary to Utah law and the evidencef and 
highly prejudicial to the defendants. 
B. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY SHAUNA HODGES 
WITH REGARD TO HER SPECIAL DAMAGES DID 
NOT SUPPORT HER CLAIM OR THE JURY'S AWARD 
In his final argument, plaintiff's counsel stated: 
There are $24,515 in actual damages. Look 
at medical bills, just the ones that were 
attributed to Shauna. Look at her wages. She 
was only making $4,9 35 a year. Look at what she 
made in '81, '82 and since then. Look what she 
paid in legal fees. She was only making 4,000 
and it cost her 24,000. 
(Supp. Tr. 15) 
The plaintiff offered in proof of her medical expenses only the 
testimony of Dave Christensen, a clinical social worker, and a 
statement from County Mental Health Services (Exh. 26-P). Mr. 
Christensen testified that he charged plaintiff $45 per hour for 
approximately weekly hour sessions from June, 1984. (Tr. 159) Upon 
further questioning, however, Mr. Christensen was unable to 
distinguish which of the entries on Exh. 18-P, his statement for 
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services, were attributable to treatment of Shauna Hodges, alone, 
as opposed to treatment of her family. (Tr. 160, 162, 164, 175) He 
further admitted that the behavior of Ms. Hodges' son had an adverse 
effect upon Ms. Hodges' emotional condition both before and after 
her arrest. (Tr. 165-166) Additionally, Mr. Christensen stated that 
his estimate of six months further treatment for Ms. Hodges was merely 
a guess. He could be no more specific. (Tr. 178) Plaintiff-
respondent's testimony with regard to the County Mental Health 
Services bill purported to distinguish between her individual therapy 
and the therapy offered to her entire family. She was not able to 
testify that those treatments were necessarily incurred as a proximate 
result of defendants-appellants' conduct nor that the cost for such 
services was reasonable. (Tr. 353-355) 
In support of her legal defense expensesf plaintiff-respondent 
offered only statements (Exh. 24-P) from Gilbert Athay, her second 
attorney, and two checks to Dean Mitchellf her first attorney. (Exh. 
25-P) The total expense represented by these exhibits was $3f500. 
The $2,000 payment to Mr. Mitchell was challenged by plaintiff-
respondent, although she did not actually file suit to recover the 
amount paid. (Tr. 39 3-39 4) 
The jury was presented with only the preceding evidence which 
left them to speculate both as to the amount of plaintiff's special 
damages and as to whether those expenses were reasonably incurred as 
a result of her arrest and termination. Such unsubstantiated damages 
should not have been submitted to the jury. 
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CONCLUSION 
The jury's verdict in this case should be set aside. The verdict 
was based on erroneous instruction from the trial court with regard 
to wrongful discharge, malicious prosecution, and damages. There 
was unsufficient evidence to submit to the jury the issues of wrongful 
discharge, malicious prosecution, punitive damages, or special 
damages. None of the bases for plaintiff-respondent's suit or the 
jury's verdict were supported by the evidence. 
Respectfully submitted this y ^ ~ day of April, 19 86. 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
^ ^ ^-^ti^^A 
F. ROBERT BAYLE 
^ 
OA^-
ANDREA C. ALCABES 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
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ANDERSON, attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent, at 50 West Broadway, 
Sixth Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, on this / A ^ d a y of April, 
1986. 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
RORFRT RAYT.R V F. ROBERT BAYLE 
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
iAUNA F. HODGES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
[BSON PRODUCTS COMPANY, dba 
IBSON'S DISCOUNT CENTER, a 
tah corporation, and CHAD 
ROSGROVE, an individual, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
CIVIL NO. C-83-6026 
1. Do you find the defendant Gibson Products Co. liable 
or malicious prosecution? 
Yes )/( No 
2. Do you find defendant Gibson Products Co. liable for 
ntentionally inflicting severe emotional distress upon the 
laintiff? 
Yes No y 
3. Do you find the defendant Gibson Products Co. liable 
or wrongful termination of the plaintiff? 
Yes /*C No 
If you answered " y e s " to any of the above , then answer 
o s . 4 and 5. If you answered "no" to each of Nos. 1, 2 and 
i above, then do not proceed to Nos. 4 and 5, proceed d i r e c t l y 
:o No. 6. 
ADDENDUM 
- 2 7 -
4* State the amount of compensatory damages to be awarded 
plaintiff against defendant Gibson Products Co. 
5. State the amount of punitive damages to be awarded 
to plaintiff against defendant Gibson Products Co. 
6. Do you find the defendant Chad Crosgrove liable for 
malicious prosecution? 
Yes y<( No 
1. Do you find the defendant Chad Crosgrove liable for 
intentionally inflicting severe emotional distress upon the 
plaintiff? 
Yes No X 
If you answered "yes" to either No. 6 or No. 7, then answer 
Nos. 8 and 9. If you answered "no" to both Nos. 6 and 7, then 
do not proceed to answer Nos. 8 and 9. 
8. State the amount of compensatory damages to be awarded 
to plaintiff against defendant Chad Crosgrove. 
$ /&<£&<£ 
y 
9. State the amount of punitive damages to be awarded 
to plaintiff against defendant Chad Crosgrove. 
10. Do you find that the plaintiff converted funds of the 
defendant Gibsons Products Co. as alleged in the counterclaim? 
Yes No X 
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11. If you answered "yes" to No. 10, what was the amount 
lereof? 
DATED: J uly /S , 1985. 
FOREMAN 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 31 
The officers and agents of Gibson Products Co. should have 
een entirely familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding 
.he allegations they made to the West Valley Police concerning 
.he plaintiff. They were required to be sufficiently informed 
>f the facts to initiate the criminal proceedings without any 
iurther investigation. 
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.—3 ^O 
I hereby instruct you that the criminal action against 
3 plaintiff was dismissed by the court and that it was 
erefore terminated favorably on behalf of the plaintiff. 
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INSTRUCTION NO, 
Elements of Malicious Prosecution 
Plaintiff has alleged that defendants maliciously caused 
iminal proceedings to be brought against her. To find either 
both defendants guilty of malicious prosecution, plaintiff 
ist establish the following elements by preponderance of the 
ridence: 
(a) that the defendants initiated or procured the institution 
: criminal proceedings against plaintiff who was not guilty 
: the charge, and that the defendants initiated or procured 
le proceedings without probable cause and primarily for a purpose 
zher than that of bringing an offender to justice; and 
(b# the proceedings have terminated in favor of the accused. 
If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff 
is proved all of the elements, then you may find the defendants 




Plaintiff was free to quit her employment with defendant 
at any time, and defendant was free to discharge plaintiff at 
any time without cause. However, if you find from a preponderance 
of the evidence that the plaintiff was discharged on the basis 
of a false criminal accusation known to defendant Gibson Products 
Co. to be false, then you may find the defendant Gibson Products 
Co. guilty of wrongful discharge of the plaintiff. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. // 
In this, as in every suit for damages, the parties 
:e required to allege the amount of damages claimed, and under 
) circumstances could there be an award of damages in excess 
: the amount demanded, but the amount thus alleged constitutes 
D evidence and is no indication of the amount to which a party 
ay be entitled. The fact that the court has instructed you 
Dncerning damages is not to be taken as any indication that the 
Durt either believes or does not believe that plaintiff is 
ntitled to recover such damages. The instructions in reference 
o damages are given as a guide in case you find from a pre-
onderance of the evidence the plaintiff is entitled to recover, 
s it is the court's duty to state to you fully all of the law 
pplicable to this case; but should your determination be that 
here should be no recovery, then you will entirely disregard 
he instructions given you upon the matter of damages. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
The plaintiff alleges that by reason of her claimed injuries, 
>r which she claims the defendants are liable, she has sustained 
>neral damages in the sum of $200,000.00 for severe emotional 
istress, mental anguish and pain and suffering, and has lost 
n additional sum of $26,515.00, on account of the costs of 
he therapy that she has undergone as a result of the malicious 
rosecution, loss of wages, and cost of legal fees for defense 
f the criminal proceeding. 
These allegations are not evidence, but are merely the 
extent of the plaintiff's claims, and must not be considered 
3y you as evidence in the case. 
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